VSTO Office files are Office document files linked to a Visual Studio Office File application. When opened, they launch a custom .NET application. There are various ways to achieve this, including methods to serve the VSTO files via an external web server. An article was recently published on the creation of these document files for … Continue reading Analyzing VSTO Office Files
Author: didiernviso
Analyzing a “multilayer” Maldoc: A Beginner’s Guide
In this blog post, we will not only analyze an interesting malicious document, but we will also demonstrate the steps required to get you up and running with the necessary analysis tools. There is also a howto video for this blog post. I was asked to help with the analysis of a PDF document containing … Continue reading Analyzing a “multilayer” Maldoc: A Beginner’s Guide
Cobalt Strike: Overview – Part 7
This is an overview of a series of 6 blog posts we dedicated to the analysis and decryption of Cobalt Strike traffic. We include videos for different analysis methods. In part 1, we explain that Cobalt Strike traffic is encrypted using RSA and AES cryptography, and that we found private RSA keys that can help … Continue reading Cobalt Strike: Overview – Part 7
Cobalt Strike: Memory Dumps – Part 6
This is an overview of different methods to create and analyze memory dumps of Cobalt Strike beacons. This series of blog posts describes different methods to decrypt Cobalt Strike traffic. In part 1 of this series, we revealed private encryption keys found in rogue Cobalt Strike packages. In part 2, we decrypted Cobalt Strike traffic starting with … Continue reading Cobalt Strike: Memory Dumps – Part 6
Cobalt Strike: Decrypting DNS Traffic – Part 5
Cobalt Strike beacons can communicate over DNS. We show how to decode and decrypt DNS traffic in this blog post. This series of blog posts describes different methods to decrypt Cobalt Strike traffic. In part 1 of this series, we revealed private encryption keys found in rogue Cobalt Strike packages. In part 2, we decrypted … Continue reading Cobalt Strike: Decrypting DNS Traffic – Part 5
Cobalt Strike: Decrypting Obfuscated Traffic – Part 4
Encrypted Cobalt Strike C2 traffic can be obfuscated with malleable C2 data transforms. We show how to deobfuscate such traffic. This series of blog posts describes different methods to decrypt Cobalt Strike traffic. In part 1 of this series, we revealed private encryption keys found in rogue Cobalt Strike packages. In part 2, we decrypted … Continue reading Cobalt Strike: Decrypting Obfuscated Traffic – Part 4
Detecting DCSync and DCShadow Network Traffic
This blog post on detecting Mimikatz' DCSync and DCShadow network traffic, accompanies SANS webinar "Detecting DCSync and DCShadow Network Traffic". Intro Mimikatz provides two commands to interact with a Windows Domain Controller and extract or alter data from the Active Directory database. These two commands are dcsync and dcshadow. The dcsync command can be used, … Continue reading Detecting DCSync and DCShadow Network Traffic
Cobalt Strike: Using Process Memory To Decrypt Traffic – Part 3
We decrypt Cobalt Strike traffic with cryptographic keys extracted from process memory. This series of blog posts describes different methods to decrypt Cobalt Strike traffic. In part 1 of this series, we revealed private encryption keys found in rogue Cobalt Strike packages. And in part 2, we decrypted Cobalt Strike traffic starting with a private … Continue reading Cobalt Strike: Using Process Memory To Decrypt Traffic – Part 3
Cobalt Strike: Using Known Private Keys To Decrypt Traffic – Part 2
We decrypt Cobalt Strike traffic using one of 6 private keys we found. In this blog post, we will analyze a Cobalt Strike infection by looking at a full packet capture that was taken during the infection. This analysis includes decryption of the C2 traffic. If you haven't already, we invite you to read part … Continue reading Cobalt Strike: Using Known Private Keys To Decrypt Traffic – Part 2
Cobalt Strike: Using Known Private Keys To Decrypt Traffic – Part 1
We found 6 private keys for rogue Cobalt Strike software, enabling C2 network traffic decryption. The communication between a Cobalt Strike beacon (client) and a Cobalt Strike team server (C2) is encrypted with AES (even when it takes place over HTTPS). The AES key is generated by the beacon, and communicated to the C2 using … Continue reading Cobalt Strike: Using Known Private Keys To Decrypt Traffic – Part 1