Firewall network traffic logs are the largest driver of Microsoft Sentinel ingestion costs. Yet they remain a critical source of information for threat detection, investigations & incident response. Explore how Sentinel Summary Rules can reduce the cost of ingesting firewall traffic events while retaining the visibility SecOp teams need to detect threats & investigate incidents.
Category: Detection Engineering
Reducing Microsoft Sentinel Costs Without Compromising Detection – Part 1: The Summary Rules Quest
This blog is the first in a series exploring how Summary Rules, together with Auxiliary or Data Lake storage, can help organizations optimize SIEM costs without compromising core threat detection and monitoring capabilities.
The Detection & Response Chronicles: Covert Operations Through QEMU
Adversaries have always relied on legitimate tools to carry out their attacks. These tools are already trusted by security solutions, which allows them to blend in with normal activity, maintain a low footprint, and make detection much harder for defenders. By using these legitimate tools, adversaries can carry out a wide range of actions, such as moving laterally across networks, establishing C2 channels, or maintaining persistence, all without triggering any alerts.
Capture the Kerberos Flag: Detecting Kerberos Anomalies
Kerberos is one of the most common protocols in organizations that utilize Windows Active Directory, and an essential part of Windows authentication used to verify the identity of a user or a host [1]. As such, Kerberos is often a target for adversaries trying to either steal or forge Kerberos tickets [2]. In this blog … Continue reading Capture the Kerberos Flag: Detecting Kerberos Anomalies
ConsentFix (a.k.a. AuthCodeFix): Detecting OAuth2 Authorization Code Phishing
ConsentFix (a.k.a.AuthCodeFix) is the latest variant of the fix-type phishing attacks, initially identified by Push Security. In this technique, the adversary tricks the victim into generating an OAuth authorization code that is part of a localhost URL, by signing in to the Azure CLI instance (or other vulnerable applications). Then, the victim is instructed to copy that URL and paste it into a phishing website, essentially handing over the authorization code to the adversary, who is now able to exchange it for an access token. Using the access token, the adversary gets access to the victim's Microsoft account.
Detection Engineering: Practicing Detection-as-Code โ Tuning โ Part 8
In Part 7, we showcased how we can leverage automation to continuously monitor the performance and trigger rate of our deployed detections. In this part, we are going to investigate how we can introduce automation and utilize continuous deployment pipelines to streamline the tedious task of tuning our detections.






