Lunar Spider Expands their Web via FakeCaptcha

Key Findings Lunar Spider has expanded its initial access methods by compromising vulnerable websites, particularly in Europe, using Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) vulnerabilities. These websites are then injected with a FakeCaptcha framework. The FakeCaptcha framework is introduced via a JavaScript script that generates an iframe, overlaying the original site's content with the attacker's FakeCaptcha page. … Continue reading Lunar Spider Expands their Web via FakeCaptcha

Analysis of a trojanized jQuery script: GootLoader unleashed

Update 24/10/202: We have noticed 2 changes since we published this report 3 months ago. The code has been adapted to use registry key โ€œHKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Personalizationโ€ instead of โ€œHKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Phoneโ€ (sample SHA256 ed2f654b5c5e8c05c27457876f3855e51d89c5f946c8aefecca7f110a6276a6e) When the payload is Cobalt Strike, the beacon configuration now contains hostnames for the C2, like r1dark[.]ssndob[.]cn[.]com and r2dark[.]ssndob[.]cn[.]com (all prior CS samples we … Continue reading Analysis of a trojanized jQuery script: GootLoader unleashed

Hunting Emotet campaigns with Kusto

Introduction Emotet doesn't need an introduction anymore - it is one of the more prolific cybercriminal gangs and has been around for many years. In January 2021, a disruption effort took place via Europol and other law enforcement authorities to take Emotet down for good. [1] Indeed, there was a significant decrease in Emotet malicious … Continue reading Hunting Emotet campaigns with Kusto