Analysis of a trojanized jQuery script: GootLoader unleashed

Update 24/10/202: We have noticed 2 changes since we published this report 3 months ago. The code has been adapted to use registry key “HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Personalization” instead of “HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Phone” (sample SHA256 ed2f654b5c5e8c05c27457876f3855e51d89c5f946c8aefecca7f110a6276a6e) When the payload is Cobalt Strike, the beacon configuration now contains hostnames for the C2, like r1dark[.]ssndob[.]cn[.]com and r2dark[.]ssndob[.]cn[.]com (all prior CS samples we … Continue reading Analysis of a trojanized jQuery script: GootLoader unleashed

Hunting Emotet campaigns with Kusto

Introduction Emotet doesn't need an introduction anymore - it is one of the more prolific cybercriminal gangs and has been around for many years. In January 2021, a disruption effort took place via Europol and other law enforcement authorities to take Emotet down for good. [1] Indeed, there was a significant decrease in Emotet malicious … Continue reading Hunting Emotet campaigns with Kusto

Kernel Karnage – Part 7 (Out of the Lab and Back to Reality)

This week I emerge from the lab and put on a different hat. 1. Switching hats With Interceptor being successful in blinding $vendor2 sufficiently to run a meterpreter reverse shell, it is time to put on the red team hat and get out of the perfect lab environment. To do just that, I had to … Continue reading Kernel Karnage – Part 7 (Out of the Lab and Back to Reality)

Kernel Karnage – Part 6 (Last Call)

With the release of this blogpost, we’re past the halfway point of my internship; time flies when you’re having fun. 1. Introduction - Status Report In the course of these 6 weeks, I’ve covered several aspects of kernel drivers and EDR/AVs kernel mechanisms. I started off strong by examining kernel callbacks and why EDR/AV products … Continue reading Kernel Karnage – Part 6 (Last Call)

New mobile malware family now also targets Belgian financial apps

While banking trojans have been around for a very long time now, we have never seen a mobile malware family attack the applications of Belgian financial institutions. Until today... Earlier this week, the Italy-based Cleafy published an article about a new android malware family which they dubbed TeaBot. The sample we will take a look … Continue reading New mobile malware family now also targets Belgian financial apps

How to analyze mobile malware: a Cabassous/FluBot Case study

This blogpost explains all the steps I took while analyzing the Cabassous/FluBot malware. I wrote this while analyzing the sample and I've written down both successful and failed attempts at moving forward, as well as my thoughts/options along the way. As a result, this blogpost is not a writeup of the Cabassous/FluBot malware, but rather … Continue reading How to analyze mobile malware: a Cabassous/FluBot Case study

Epic Manchego – atypical maldoc delivery brings flurry of infostealers

In July 2020, NVISO detected a set of malicious Excel documents, also known as “maldocs”, that deliver malware through VBA-activated spreadsheets. While the malicious VBA code and the dropped payloads were something we had seen before, it was the specific way in which the Excel documents themselves were created that caught our attention. The creators … Continue reading Epic Manchego – atypical maldoc delivery brings flurry of infostealers